

# جایگاه منابع انرژی دریای خزر در محیط متغیر امنیت جهانی

دکتر بهرام نوازی

استادیار روابط بین‌الملل در دانشگاه بین‌المللی امام خمینی (ره)

واژگان مهم: انرژی، دریای خزر، امنیت جهانی، جهانی‌شدن

## چکیده:

پایان جنگ سرد نقطه عطفی در روابط بین‌المللی و پایانی بر رقابت جهانی دو قطبی ایالات متحده و اتحاد شوروی بشمار می‌آید و موجب تغییر بنیادین محیط امنیتی بین‌المللی در جهان گردید. احتمال جنگ رو در روی قدرت‌های بزرگ از میان رفت و جهانیان در انتظار یک دوره سراسر رفاه و آرامش و فارغ از تهدیدات امنیتی بودند که با به قدرت رسیدن هیئت حاکمه جورج دبلیو بوش در ایالات متحده و بهره‌برداری از واقعه تروریستی ۱۱ سپتامبر ۲۰۰۱ بعنوان بهانه‌ای برای تشکیل یک ائتلاف بین‌المللی برای مبارزه با تروریسم، رهبری تهاجم به افغانستان و عراق به دست ایالات متحده افتاد. این تهاجمات حاکی از آن است که نوع جدیدی از تهدید جهانی نامتقارن و بی‌تناسب از سوی ایالات متحده در حال شکل‌گیری است که بطور پیشگیرانه در پی پیشی گرفتن بر توانایی‌های نظامی دیگر ملت‌ها است و ملت‌های منطقه دریای خزر خارج از این تهدید نمی‌باشد.

این محیط جدید امنیتی چیزی فراتر از یک افزایش توان نظامی و بهنگام سازی تسلیحاتی می‌باشد و شاید بتوان از آن بعنوان یک "تغییر" نام برد که نقشه‌ای جز تصاحب مزایای رقابتی آینده و سازگاری با چالش‌های امنیتی در قرن ۲۱ ندارد. کانون اصلی این نقشه مربوط به دهه ۱۹۹۰ و حول و حوش برنامه "جهانی‌سازی" قرار دارد. نگاهی به دخالت‌های نظامی ایالات متحده در خلال ۱۴ ساله که از فروپاشی اتحاد شوروی می‌گذرد نشان می‌دهد که بیشتر این موارد در مناطقی قرار داشته‌اند که با فرآیند "جهانی‌شدن" ناهماهنگ و ناآشنا بوده‌اند و کشورهای ساحلی دریای خزر بخاطر اینکه بیشتر گرفتار جنگ و تهدید، فقر و بیماری و نظام‌های اقتدارگرای نظامی بوده‌اند، می‌تواند فرصتی برای ایالات متحده فراهم کند تا از طریق نظامی درصدد "صدور امنیت" و "برداشتن این فاصله یا شکاف" برآید و برای اینکار بهانه‌هایی همچون مهار، عمل متقابل و یا حتی حمله پیشگیرانه کافی بنظر می‌رسد.

## Caspian Sea Energy Fields in the Transforming Global Security Environment

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### *Abstract*

The collapse of the Soviet Union, marked the end of the bi-polar world struggle and the terrorist event of 11 September 2001 signaled a foundational shift in the international security environment for all. As a pretext the US initiated its unlegitimate attack to Afghanistan and Iraq preemptively to circumvent the military strengths of other nations. This new security environment can be a "Transformation" and therefore needs something more than just an update of the military's capabilities based upon a new map and vision of the world security environment to ensure its future competitive advantages and to adapt to the evolving security challenges of the 21st century.

The pivotal focus of this mapping is around a 1990s "project" called Globalization. During the past 14 years since the collapse of the Soviets, the US has sent its military to more than 130 cases, the overwhelming majority of these cases lie in regions that are out of sync with globalization. Disconnected countries from the "process" globalization, such as the Caspian Sea region may face with the danger of "Exporting Security" and "Shrinking the Gap" by the US military moves from containment and retaliation to a more proactive and preemptive approach to national security.

## Introduction

Prior to the event of 11 September 2001, the geopolitical importance of the Caspian Basin — notably Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, and to a lesser degree Russia, Iran, and Uzbekistan — primarily was defined by energy. While providing attractive investment and business opportunities to international entities, the development of the Caspian oil and gas could make a significant contribution to world energy supplies, if the littoral countries would agree on any legal regime of cooperative action or the division of the sea. Some hailed oil and gas deposits in the region as a second Persian Gulf,<sup>1</sup> or at least the third largest in the world,<sup>2</sup> after the North Sea, that amounts to 10% of the earth's potential oil reserves.<sup>3</sup> Energy concerns have not only existed today, but, given the instability in oil prices and the western countries desire to seek alternative oil from the Persian Gulf and to diversify supply, the region's strategic importance on this score has become even more important.

Commentators used to speak of a new “great game” for regional hegemony and natural resources between the USA, Russia, Iran, Turkey and China and revolved around energy exploration and “pipeline politics”, that the terrorist attack of 11 September put this region on the radar screen of many policymakers for security reasons. One might think, however, that other events and concerns have impinged on the energy question in the region and have affected the calculations and strategies of various states and companies involved in energy extraction and transportation.

In this paper, I will evaluate the regional problems concernig the 5 litoral states, the politics of energy within the frame of global security with primary consideration given to American policy in the region and with a particular eye on changes since 11 September. My goal is not only to describe how policy on this question has evolved but also to situate the issue within broader questions of American foreign policy, paying special attention to what factors and actors shape it today.

## Caspian Sea Regional Opportunities

The Caspian Sea contains six separate hydrocarbon basins. As of June 2002, forty oil and gas deposits had been discovered along with more than 400 promising structures.<sup>4</sup> The Caspian Sea region are believed to be sitting on what amounts to 10-15% of the earth's potential oil reserves. Proven reserves estimated to be between 17 and 33 billion barrels (BBL), comparable to Qatar on the low end, and the US on the high end. The regions proven natural gas reserves are also estimated at 232 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) comparable to that of Saudi Arabia. (See table 1)

**Table 1: Caspian Sea Region: Oil and Gas Reserves as in August 2003**

	Country	Proven	Potential	Total
Oil Reserves	Azerbaijan	7 - 12.5 BBL	32 BBL	39 – 44.5 BBL
	Iran	0.1 BBL	15 BBL	15.1 BBL
	Kazakhstan	9 - 17.6 BBL	92 BBL	101 – 109.6 BBL
	Russia	0.3 BBL	7 BBL	7.3 BBL

<sup>1</sup> Initial estimates of energy deposits in the region (in 1990s) were as high as 200 billion barrels of oil (about 20% of the world's proven reserves) and 20 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. In 2001 it estimated 40-60 billion barrels of oil and 10-15 trillion cubic meters of gas. See John Roberts, "Energy Reserves, Pipeline Routes and the Legal Regime in the Caspian Sea," in Gennady Churfin, ed. *The Security of the Caspian Sea Region*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 34

<sup>2</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1948048.stm>

<sup>3</sup> The Energy Information Administration (EIA) cited in <http://www.eia.doe.gov>

<sup>4</sup> Hossein Askari, “Caspian oil development: the sooner the better; a trade-off analysis and a basis for agreement”, *Monthly Review*, Feb, 2004

	Turkmenistan	0.5 - 1.7 BBL	38 BBL	38.5 – 39.7 BBL
	Uzbekistan	0.3 - 0.6 BBL	2 BBL	2.3 – 2.6 BBL
	Total	17.2 -32.8 BBL	186 BBL	203.2 – 218.8 BBL
Gas Reserves				
	Azerbaijan	30 Tcf	35 Tcf	85 Tcf
	Iran	0 Tcf	10.6 Tcf	10.6 Tcf
	Kazakhstan	65 Tcf	88.3 Tcf	153.3 Tcf
	Russia	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Turkmenistan	71 Tcf	158.9 Tcf	229.9 Tcf
	Uzbekistan	66 Tcf	35 Tcf	101 Tcf
	Total	232 Tcf	327.8 Tcf	559.8 Tcf

‡Only the areas near the Caspian Sea are included.

Source: The Energy Information Administration (EIA) cited in <http://www.eia.doe.gov>

In 2002, regional oil production reached roughly 1.6 million barrels per day, comparable to Brazil. By 2010, production is forecasted to reach between 3 and 5 million barrels per day, which exceeds annual production from Venezuela. Regional gas production also reached approximately 4.5 Tcf in 2001, comparable to the combined production of South and Central America and Mexico. In 2010, it is expected to reach a total of 8.7 Tcf, more than 2001 production from the entire Middle East. (See table 2)

**Table 2: Caspian Sea Region Oil (Thousand Barrels per Day) and Gas Production**

	Country	1992	2002	2010
Oil Production	Azerbaijan	222	318	789-1,140
	Iran	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Kazakhstan	530	939	1,617-2,400
	Russia	N/A	N/A	150
	Turkmenistan	110	184	374- 964
	Uzbekistan	66	152	205- 240
	Total	928	1,593	3,135-4,894
Gas Production		1992	2001	2010
	Azerbaijan	0.28	0.2	0.6
	Iran	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Kazakhstan	0.29	0.36	1.7
	Russia	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Turkmenistan	2.02	1.7	402
	Uzbekistan	1.51	2.23	2.2
	Total	4.1	4.49	8.7

‡Only the areas near the Caspian Sea are included.

Source: The Energy Information Administration (EIA) cited in <http://www.eia.doe.gov>

During the recent years the Caspian Sea region has witnessed some great breakthroughs in developing and producing its reserves such as an 8 billion, 30-year contract of September 1994 labeled “the deal of the century” and formation of the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium for development of three oil fields with reserves of about 3–5 billion barrels, construction of an oil pipeline from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan through Georgia, loans granted by foreign banks to modernize the Turkmenistan natural gas pipeline, inauguration of a pipeline in 29 April 2004, for exporting 170 thousands barrel a day of Russian, Kazakh and Turkmen oil in swap to provide Iran's northern oil refineries in return for Iranian oil at ports in the Persian Gulf which is planed to be extended up to 1 million barrel a day and agreement of 17 May 2004, for construction of Kazakhstan 990-kilometer oil pipeline to China (Atasu-Alashankou) to be completed by the end of 2005 with the initial throughput capacity of 10 million tons of oil annually with a planned expansion to 20 million

tons at a later stage.<sup>5</sup>

However, major operations cannot get under way in all the five littoral states without any consensus on the legal status and expensive improvements in the infrastructure and equipment. At present boundaries are actually drawn according to the countries' respective coastlines which frequently named at "the Modified Median Line". According to the terms of the bilateral agreements, the marine resources are divided into national sectors based on the principle of equidistance of the international Law of the Sea. Under the Modified Median Line method, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan would get 21 percent, 13.6 percent, 28.4 percent, 19% and 18% respectively.<sup>6</sup>

Although Russia has finalized agreements with both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (the latter concluded in 2002), thereby opening up the northern section of the sea to full-fledged exploration, a final agreement for the legal status of the Caspian Sea among all five littoral states still unresolved and remains elusive; Iran has always condemned such major deals as illegitimate. The lack of agreement with Iran has been not only a barrier to development of the Caspian Sea and unconfidence of foreign investors from the West who are queuing up for their share of the exploitation rights and the profits, but also a great loss of time and resources for Iran because a one-year delay in reaching an agreement would mean that oil would flow four years from the date of contract signing.<sup>7</sup> While a line to Iran is the most economical solution, given the short distance and the nation's well developed oil production and exporting capabilities, the US adamantly oppositions and sanctions have also made it difficult for the Western giants to claim a stake in the Caspian oil.

The land-locked Kazakhstan has a huge oil reserves that cannot get the oil to coast for export with ease. The amount of Kazakh oil that could flow through Russian pipelines is limited and, on a few occasions, shut off entirely, with the claim that Kazakh oil was too sulfuric to be transported by the Russian pipeline network.<sup>8</sup> To help defray costs, the countries have to scout out international partners for development of the reserves and for construction of much-needed new pipelines. Azerbaijan has attracted the most attention from foreign investors but it was only after Azerbaijan gravitated further out of Moscow's orbit for Moscow's de facto alliance with Yerevan in peace talks concerning the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and turned to the West and Turkey for political support and investment in energy projects.<sup>9</sup>

Russia that initially was intent on charting a course of Westernization and approached the alliance with the West, changed its foreign policy in the mid 1990s away from Westernization and toward what has been dubbed Eurasianism, or a Monroeski Doctrine, a policy that asserted special rights for Russia in the post-Soviet space (dubbed the near abroad), argued for a more assertive Russian policy in the region, and, in some variants, envisioned the reintegration of some post-Soviet states into the Russian state.<sup>10</sup> There are significant forces

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.kazakhembus.com/052004.html>

<sup>6</sup> Hossein Askari, op. cit.

<sup>7</sup> Hossein Askari's argument in this regard is worth mentioning: "If there is a five-year delay [in reaching an agreement], Iran's share would be \$5,198 million even if it gets 20% of the Caspian, a figure similar to \$5,176 million (the amount Iran would receive if it accepted 13.6% of the Caspian today). Thus, the trade-off for Iran is that if it takes more than five years to get the agreement it wants, it should settle for 13.6% (less than 20 percent) today". See Hossein Askari, op. cit.,

<sup>8</sup> Richard Pomfret, *The Economies of Central Asia*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 157, 191

<sup>9</sup> Stephen Blank, "Every Shark East of Suez: Great Power Interests, Policies and Tactics in the Transcaspian Energy Wars," *Central Asian Survey* 18, no. 2, 1999, p. 168

<sup>10</sup> David Kerr, "The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 6, 1995: pp. 977-88

within Russia - particularly in the Duma and the military - remain suspicious of US moves and motives in the region and fear yet another surrender to the West. In the words of one Russian writer, the West's "pipeline plans" will make the "near abroad" the "far abroad a little earlier than it is acceptable to consider in Moscow, where all proceeds in accordance with the splendid opinion that 'they have nowhere to go apart from us' ... all that will remain, so it seems, will be consoling oneself with the naive myths of imperial origins."<sup>11</sup>

As Russia lacks the capital to match Western firms and governments, rather than sit out of the energy bonanza, managed to gain shares of some of the most important projects in the region. For example, Lukoil gained a 10% stake in the 1994 "deal of the century" Azerbaijani Consortium, a 32.5% share of the offshore Karabakh field, a 10% stake in the Shah Deniz fields, and stakes in the Kumkol-Lukoil and Tengizchevroil projects in Kazakhstan, and Gazprom was included in plans to exploit the Karachaganak field in Kazakhstan. It is quite reasonable that while a pipeline to Russia is under construction, Kazakhstan tries to escape from Russian policymakers' radar screen and influence by building a second new pipeline to another nearby country, such as China.

Thus, what seems to be emerging in the Caspian Sea region is a sort of division of spoils. Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan are on the Russian side; Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan are allied with the United States; Georgia and Kyrgyzstan are subject to substantial influence from Russia and the United States, both of which have troops in these countries; and Turkmenistan ostensibly pursues its long-standing policy of active neutrality.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, this division appears to be satisfactory for both major powers. For the United States, even Brzezinski conceded that the United States should agree to divide influence in the region with Russia, not only to battle Islamic extremism but also to divide energy pipelines necessary to the economies of both the former CCCP and the West.<sup>13</sup>

Talk of prospects for political participation in the Caspian Sea region seemingly represents the triumph of hope over experience. Nowhere in this region will the requirements for and understanding of genuine democracy materialize anytime soon, either in elite or mass practice or its imminent advent upon the scene.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, both here and in Russia as well, the transplantation of Western and democratic institutions paradoxically often has strengthened authoritarian rule, not liberalism or democracy, as Bernard Lewis argues.<sup>15</sup> Even some believe that "the demand to democratize" these countries "amounts to a call for a revolutionary transformation of those areas, especially when perceived from local capitals".<sup>16</sup> Russia, the most advanced governments of the region, manifests disquieting and regressive efforts to restore the outlines of a police capitalism, or it moves to frustrate such essential democratic rights as free press, meaningful elections, and civilian democratic control of the instruments of violence.<sup>17</sup>

Turkmenistan, whose Turkmenbashi (literally, 'Chief of the Turkmen'), was unanimously

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<sup>11</sup> Armen Khanbalyan, from *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 2 February 2002, quoted in Paul Kubicek, "Russian energy policy in the Caspian Basin" > <http://www.findarticles.com>

<sup>12</sup> Paul Kubicek, *op. cit.*; Some note that recent deals between Russia and Turkmenistan show that Niyazov "was willing to pay his masters for keeping himself in power." See James Purcell Smith, "Turkmenbashi's Gas Games: Gas for Power?" *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, 4 June 2003.

<sup>13</sup> *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 4 November 2003, p. 5 cited in Paul Kubicek, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> Lilia Shevtsova, *Putin's Russia*, Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003; Taras Kuzio, "Back to the USSR? Ukraine Holds Soviet-Style 'Discussion' of Political Reform," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newslines*, 28 April 2003.

<sup>15</sup> Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

<sup>16</sup> Stephen Blank, *op. cit.*

<sup>17</sup> Lilia Shevtsova, *op. cit.*

approved as president for life by the Turkmen National Assembly on 28 December 1999 tries to manage personally all spheres of social life in keeping with his statement that Turkmen society is not ready to introduce a multi-party system. Political life in the country is based on the activity of only one party, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, headed by Niazov, which for all intents and purposes is nothing more than the former Communist Party of Turkmenistan.<sup>18</sup> Thus the Caspian Sea governments resembles what Max Weber long ago called pseudo-constitutionalism, hardly the same thing as pseudodemocracy.<sup>19</sup> Thus throughout these region the road to democracy will necessarily be long, winding, and often tortuous. Indeed, Turkmenistan has deteriorated to a tragic and yet farcical restaging of Stalinism's worst excesses, representing almost a paradigm, if not a caricature, of Weber's category of sultanism.<sup>20</sup>

To this political and economic situation is added fundamental environmental problems, including the sea's changing environment; the restructuring of the Caspian Sea's biological system; and the fate of the area's unique biological resources. Among the concerns are the growing levels of pesticides detected in the water, particularly off the coasts of Azerbaijan and Iran. Toxic waste dumping, oil leaks, agricultural run-off, and over-fishing of the caviar-producing sturgeon fish, have all contributed to the Caspian's serious ecological decline.

How the Caspian Sea hydrocarbon reserves are developed will have further impact on world oil markets. The development of the Caspian Sea oil and gas would enhance the diversification of global energy supplies, an important consideration in energy security. Politically speaking, some western countries mainly the US would also like to see the oil distributed away from the volatile Middle East, which already controls the bulk of the world's supply.

### *The US threatening global security landscape*

The collapse of the Soviet Union, marked the end of the bi-polar world struggle and the terrorist events of 11 September 2001, as a pretext or “a terrific windfall” for the Bush administration as Gilbert Achcar puts it,<sup>21</sup> in an optimistic view, signaled a foundational shift in the international security environment for all. This new security environment, as Thomas Barnett charts, is a fundamental reason for a "Transformation" and not simply an update of the traditional military environment. Barnett's assignment with the Secretary of Defense's Office of Force Transformation (OFT)<sup>22</sup> helped reshape the direction of future military strategy based upon a new map and vision of the world security environment and adapt to the evolving security challenges of the 21st century. This US briefing entitled, "A Future Worth Creating: Defense Transformation in the New Security Environment" clearly states the US world security landscape.

The pivotal focus of this mapping is around a relatively recent (late 1980s/1990s) and evolving concept called “Globalization” that has roughly come to be defining struggle of our age. There's still much debate and controversy about globalization's specific nuances and

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<sup>18</sup> Alec Rasizade, “Turkmenbashi and his Turkmenistan”, World Affairs, Winter, 2004

<sup>19</sup> Max Weber, *The Russian Revolutions*, ed. Gordon Wells and Peter R. Baehr, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1995

<sup>20</sup> Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed. Talcott Parsons, New York, Free Press, 1964, 6243, pp. 347-48; Juan J. Linz and H. E. Chehabi, eds., *Sultanistic Regimes*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998

<sup>21</sup> Gilbert Achcar, “U.S. Imperial Strategy in the Middle East”, Monthly Review, 2004

<sup>22</sup> Donald Rumsfeld created the Office of Force Transformation just after 9/11, in response to President Bush's mandate to transform the military's capabilities to ensure its future competitive advantages in this changing security environment.

benefits. It essentially boils down, however, to the process of increased interconnectedness and interdependence between peoples and states in a world that continues to become “smaller”. Three-time Pulitzer Prize winning author Thomas Friedman defines it as:

the inexorable integration of markets, transportation systems, and communication systems to a degree never witnessed before -in a way that is enabling corporations, countries, and individuals to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before and is enabling the world to reach into corporations, countries, and individuals farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before.<sup>23</sup>

The rapid advance of communication technologies and international economic forces, especially in the last decade and a half, has accelerated the influence of globalization and has caught the imagination of a growing number of people. The Core of this globalising world is characterised with thick network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security that make ground for more stable governments with rising standards of living to harmonize its rule sets with the emerging global rule sets of democracy, transparency, free trade, free market, and collective security. These areas welcome content flow and connectivity. The Core with an estimated of 129 countries makes up roughly two-thirds of the world.

By contrast, the regions and areas out of touch with or “disconnected” from the globalization process, are regions or areas of constant conflict, poverty, disease, and repressive regimes. The majority of countries in which the US has sent its military since the end of the cold war (the last 12 years - about 132 cases), lie in regions that are out of sync with globalization or are “the Non-Integrating Gap”, as Thomas Barnett calls. According to Barnett, because “disconnectedness defines danger”, this Gap would be important to the US national security and therefore one aim of US national security strategy is to “Shrink the Gap”.<sup>24</sup> This view becomes increasingly more useful as the military moves from containment and retaliation to a more proactive and preemptive approach to national security and “exporting security” is one thing the US military is prepared to contribute.

According to Barnett, the US direction is not “to mandate types of government and how much they open that government onto the outside world in terms of accepting different leadership ideas or how they conduct their activities. The minimal thing we need to shoot for though is connectivity on an individual basis.” He believes that what actually defeated communism was not the Truman and Reagan administrations but the onset of connectivity that started since the Nixon administration with detente. He argues that

this corrected the Soviet system by letting money that had real value, and ideas, and all sorts of other things flow onto the system. And once people got enough connectivity with the outside world, they became unmanageable in an authoritarian sort of sense. The only way you can really have a true authoritarian government is to maintain very strict control over your public's access to outside information and their ability to travel abroad. This is the big stick used on them. So, again, as a bare minimum, I think what we want to get in an Iraq, what we want to encourage elsewhere is freedom--of connection, of travel, of information flow.<sup>25</sup>

To Barnett, the burden of “Exporting Security” or “Shrinking the Gap”, in areas like an Iraq and perhaps several places like Africa that suffer terribly in terms of security deficits and “hold back other countries or hold back their own people” should bear by the Americans “overwhelmingly” and will go to be “kind of a functional unilateralism” through more private rather than government “Foreign Direct Investments, which really integrate countries as we

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23 Friedman, Thomas L., *Longitudes and Attitudes: Exploring the World after September 11*, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002; Bahram Navazeni, *Globalization and its effects on Iran*, Negaresh Olum, Tehran, 1382 (2003)

<sup>24</sup> [www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=5569](http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=5569)

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*,

now see with developing Asia - it's the private money that really does it." According to him the US will be

more in central Asia, more into east central Europe and ... more in the Middle East ... in the Horn and down the eastern slope of Africa ... and to a certain extent the archipelagos countries of Southeast Asia ... because ... of dysfunctional states there ... trying to engage through a more permanent presence that's going to be on the ground as well as in the water.<sup>26</sup>

In this way the regions or countries out of the US bounds such as Iran and Russia that are not allocating a share of the Caspian's development over the next decade, as former security adviser of Carter, Brzezinski said on 8 July 1998 Addressing a hearing of a foreign relations subcommittee of the senate, then they "would try to pursue exclusionary policies in the region" and this may consequently damage the US interests and destabilise the region, threatening what will be an important energy source for Western economies in the years to come.

Milton R. Copulos, president of the US National Defense Council Foundation who has already served as a Cabinet-level energy adviser in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, asserts too that access to overseas oil supplies is "crucial both for the military and economic security of the United States" and then worth risking the US troops. To him having access to oil supplies is as the British war minister Lord Curzon commented a necessity that the Allies "floated to victory on a wave of oil".<sup>27</sup>

The US nowadays consumes 20.13 million barrels of oil per day, making it the top consumer in the world. Today, its imports from OPEC amounts 45% of its oil among which 25% is from the Persian Gulf alone and this shows that since the 1973 oil embargo it has diminished its reliance on Middle East oil and spread its supply base for energy security matter. But the developing countries increasing demand for oil such as China's 5.6 million barrels a day is a worrystore. China, for example, that used to be self-sufficient in terms of oil production and consumption; now it's a net oil importer to the tune of 1.9 million barrels a day. It is true that oil accounts for about 35.4% of the US total energy use, but it represents 96.4% of all its transportation energy use. Therefore, without petroleum, no goods or materials could be transported and the labor force could not get to work. In short, the US economy would quickly shut down".

With the closing of US bases in countries such as the Philippines, another vital repository of manpower and resources will be lost. The situation would become even more critical for the US if it loses its base in Okinawa as well. As a result, further increasing transportation energy will needed and this requirement makes oil a strategically critical commodity not only for direct military purposes but even in the peace time. Such a draconian event is not needed, however, for disruptions in the energy economy to have grave consequences. Even during the Persian Gulf war that the loss of oil supplies from Kuwait was quickly made up by increased production from other producers, most notably Saudi Arabia, the brief duration of the production shortfall caused the world oil prices rise to record levels, costing US oil consumers alone an extra \$39 billion out of \$113 billion worldwide. For the US, "the possible consequences of a supply disruption", Copulos insists, "if anything the threat is greater today than at anytime in our history."<sup>28</sup>

At the time of the 1973 embargo, the United States used to import a little more than 33% of its oil. As recently as 1985, during the Reagan administration, US oil imports were just 27.5%. But today, they are 56%, more than twice that figure. The number of operating oil

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<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>27</sup> Milton R. Copulos, "Symposium: energy policy", *Contemporary Review*, October 2003

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.*,

refineries in the United States too has steadily declined, falling from a peak of 324 in 1981 to just 158 today. While many of those that closed were small and inefficient, it still left the US with a net loss of refining capacity in excess of 2 million barrels per day. Since environmental rules have made it virtually impossible to build a new refinery in the US, in the future more and more of its refined petroleum products are likely to come from abroad. To Milton Copulos this “supply uncertainties” both in “crude oil or refined products” would be a “bad news for national security” because “there is no guarantee” that the US oil suppliers such as Saudi Arabia would be “so anxious to help in some future war, especially if it involves some other Islamic state.” Other overseas suppliers such as Venezuela are similarly problematical as well. In this way he believes that the “US energy security is in jeopardy and the Bush administration is right to sound the alarm.” He further insists that “there may be no ... manifestations of an energy crisis at the moment, but that could change in an instant. Planning now could help avoid the terrible penalties of past supply disruptions and ensure our nation's military and economic security.”<sup>29</sup>

So even though Persian Gulf oil accounts for only 30% of all oil consumed today worldwide, by 2020 it would account for 54% to 67% of all oil consumed, according to the Energy Information Agency. The Wall Street Journal (8 February 2004) summed up the US energy situation quite bluntly: “America's economy, the engine of its global preeminence, depends on some of the world's most anti-American nations for its oil.” Even though the US have diversified its oil supply base, it still remain vulnerable because its import levels are so high. According to API annual energy report to the US Congress this year:

The supply system for petroleum and natural gas is stretched to the limit ... small changes in demand or supply have resulted in sharp increases in petroleum and natural gas prices. ... Mitigating these problems requires action by the federal government to increase supplies, address demand and facilitate regulatory flexibility to help reduce volatility and ensure energy availability to consumers at affordable prices.<sup>30</sup>

This is why the US administrations try to handle changes in the world supply of oil either by the free market or the US troops. For the “economic well-being of our society” as a US vital national interests, Clinton's December 1999 report on “A National Security Strategy for a New Century” concluded “we will do what we must to defend these interests ... using our military might unilaterally and decisively,” if necessary.<sup>31</sup> Here, then, is a clear statement that the US is willing to employ military force to attain economic goals. “Bolstering America's economic prosperity” as the second of three core objectives in the 1997 document<sup>32</sup> not only requires “the free flow of oil” but also be available “at reasonable prices” and highlights “our ability to use our naval power, if necessary, to ensure our access” to oil.<sup>33</sup>

More important, Bush's administration shares this US general concern about the future of the oil market and the prospect that hydrocarbon sources will gradually dry up.<sup>34</sup> The very influential Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington expressed this concern most clearly in a November 2000 report made public in February 2001 under the title, *The Geopolitics of Energy into the 21st Century*. According to this report, world energy demand should increase by over 50% during the first two decades of the 21st century.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>30</sup> Sean Kilcarr, “Oil worries - energy security”, Fleet Owner, 1 March 2004

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/#IV>

<sup>33</sup> [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other\\_pubs/nssr99.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/nssr99.pdf)

<sup>34</sup> See Michael Klare, *Resource War*, New York, Henry Holt, 2002.

<sup>35</sup> CSIS Panel Report, *The Geopolitics of Energy into the 21st Century*, Washington, CSIS, 2000, “Executive Summary”, xvi; see also <http://www.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/10187.htm>

Oil and gas reserves in the Caspian basin are expected to play an increasingly important role beside the Persian Gulf one in meeting growing global demand, especially to avoid increasing competition for energy with and within Asia. If global oil demand estimated for 2020 is reasonably correct and an oil crisis during the following decade is to be warded off, these regional reserves should by then be producing at their full potential if other supplies have not been developed. Underlying this concern was the principle according to which a substantial safety margin of flexibility in the Caspian production must be maintained. This is crucial to the stability of the world oil market under supervision from the US, and constitutes the cornerstone of its oil policy. In fact the previously cited CSIS report, while noting that Caspian oil would be “important at the margin but not pivotal”,<sup>36</sup> indicated that foreseeable increased demand for natural gas would raise the strategic value of this energy resource in years to come.<sup>37</sup>

If one previously perhaps could have accused the US of dabbling in the region or of excessive reliance on “dollar diplomacy”,<sup>38</sup> the US adopted a much more aggressive posture after 11 September 2001. This is seen most clearly with the basing of US soldiers in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia and by the sizeable increase in US aid to countries in the region, particularly Uzbekistan. For their part, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have been more peripheral in the war on terror, but both generally have been supportive of increased US involvement in the region.<sup>39</sup>

The invasion of Afghanistan was also a chance for the Bush administration to carry out a project it had cherished since the final collapse of the CCCP. But establishing a direct US military presence in the heart of ex-Soviet Central Asia had seemed even more improbable than a US occupation of Iraq.<sup>40</sup> A military presence in the heart of the Eurasian continental mass joining Russia to China - two countries tempted to ally with each other in order to resist US hegemonic pressure more effectively, or even to ally with Iran as well - had evident geostrategic value. Besides, a US military presence in Central Asia and the Caspian basin (in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and so on) fit into its global and Middle Eastern strategy of taking control of sources of oil, supplemented in this particular case by natural gas.

### *Conclusion*

To resolve contradictions born by globalization on time and in a peaceful way, the world needs an adequate order under which the interests of all are taken into account; the world also needs efficient political mechanisms of collective management of the world processes and of crisis settlement through dialogue and peaceful management of the UN. However, the region temporarily houses American and NATO military bases; while their current deployment is explained by the continued antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan and their future causes a lot of concern in Russia, China, Iran and certain other countries of the Caspian Sea region.

Shifts in the balance of oil production from the pattern of the past decade, combined with the threat of major regional upheaval, have presented the US with a number of challenges and opportunities that will directly affect the Caspian Sea. Due to the increasing US reliance on imported oil, the US position has long been clear: the US needs to diversify the kinds of energy it uses and increase the number and geographical locations of its suppliers. It is correct

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<sup>36</sup> CSIS, *Geopolitics*, xvi.

<sup>37</sup> OPEC, *Annual*, 10, 12

<sup>38</sup> Stephen Blank, *op. cit.*, p. 162

<sup>39</sup> Paul Kubicek, *op. cit.*

<sup>40</sup> See John Bellamy Foster, Harry Magdoff, and Robert McChesney, “U.S. Military Bases and Empire”, *Monthly Review* 53, no. 10, March 2002.

that the US has an unchallengeable power and is the world's leader but as former US Secretary of Education, Dr. Richard W. Riley, says "If we are to have any hope of living in safety and security - any hope of exercising our world leadership in the constructive manner to which we all aspire - then we have to take steps to understand the rest of the world better than we do."<sup>41</sup> The US tries to create a situation in which none of the states or coalitions of states will be able not only to squeeze the US out but also to diminish its leading role. This is why the US is strengthening its economic and military presence in the Caspian Sea region through bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the local countries. Whether the US citizens and government is doing their best or not, the point is that what shall we do?

We have the will, and now must continue finding the ways to provide us with the benefits needed to survive and prosper. First of all we have to seek for ways to draw as full national participation of all our citizens in both politics and economy as we can to boost the legitimacy of our governments. We, ourselves, would better do the reforms seriously needed, before anybody else do it for us.

Next we should further cement ties and to share expertise with nations around the Caspian Sea region. The "open regionalism" principle as a preliminary step toward globalism will mobilize spiritual and material resources of all interested states and organizations to assure our regional security, prosperity and therefore stability. Economic and other forms of business contacts are important too as well as building and increasing confidence, political cooperation, trade, economic and investment activities, improving access to natural resources and markets, travel and tourism together with the cultural and humanitarian actions. This can help remove mutual mistrust and suspicion among the members and non-members and give a chance to cooperate with other regional states and organizations.

Our security in the globalized world demands our close cooperation with all states and non-state organizations and only through this I suppose we can help diminish risks and prevent or settle armed conflicts. The eradication of poverty and hunger as well as illegal activities such as transnational crimes, money laundering, cyber-crime, trafficking in drugs, arms and humans must be seen as a joint effort. The challenge for the international community is to develop new public/private partnerships, in which everybody can voice his/her own needs. To remove regional contradictions it is necessary to deepen our regional cooperation as further as possible. The Caspian Sea Security Treaty Organization may be one of the major instruments of cooperation among us.

Delays in reaching an agreement on the division of the Caspian Sea among the five littoral states are detrimental to each country's economic and financial interests. The principal reason is that delays reduce the aggregate discounted value of oil and gas revenues. While a country may think it will still gain by holding out for a larger share of the Caspian, this is uncertain. Many years have already gone by; and, as a result, they have all lost. Thus, to reduce future losses, they should agree to a decision soon. The benefits of rapid development would be significant not only for the littoral countries, but also for the international firms, especially oil, engineering, and construction companies. Finally, it will enhance the quantity and diversity of global energy supply.

The events of 11 September 2001 clearly showed that isolated states and organizations can easily be a target for repressive military action in the age of globalization. This can provide us a fresh impetus for cooperation within ourselves. In this way neither the US nor any other globalizing force will have any place to threaten or interfere with the internal affairs of any

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<sup>41</sup> Kristina Lane, Report, "Educators call for more study abroad programs: lack of global knowledge threatens the nation's security", Black Issues in Higher Education, 18 December 2003

particular country or region. It does not have enough soldiers to control its occupying territories and at the same time maintain its imperial role in relation to the rest of the world even if it plans to increase the total numbers of its armed forces or revolutionize its military technology.

Since the United States launched its war on Iraq in March 2003 the effectiveness of the UN has been called into question but the world needs to regain its self confidence and the UN must be encouraged to reform itself and play a stronger and more effective role in defusing threats to global security. But such reforms should neither be done at the expense of weaker states, nor allow any one strong country to prevail on preemptive strikes without UN agreement.